Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information: Implications for Horizontal Mergers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Yao, Xinlu
• 署名单位: Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220051
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 345-373
• 关键词: identification; COMPETITION; games

摘要

We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game , , signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be significantly above those in a static , , complete information game , , even when the possible variation in the privately observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry and show that , , without any change in conduct , , our model can explain increases in price levels and changes in price dynamics and cost pass-through after the 2008 MillerCoors joint venture. ( JEL C73, D43, D82, G34, L24, L41, L66) )