Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hanany, Eran; Klibano, Peter; Mukerji, Sujoy
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Northwestern University; University of London; Queen Mary University London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180302
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 135-187
• 关键词: Dynamic consistency; expected utility; mechanism design; equilibrium; beliefs; auctions; THEOREM; numbers; CHOICE; MODEL

摘要

We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality-each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion.