Experimenting with Career Concerns

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina; Kremer, Ilan
• 署名单位: Yale University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170411
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 260-288
• 关键词: Reputation; credit; equilibrium; INFORMATION; selection; POLICY

摘要

A manager who learns privately about a project over time may want to delay quitting it if recognizing failure/lack of success hurts his reputation. In the banking industry, managers may want to roll over bad loans. How do distortions depend on expected project quality? What are the effects of releasing public information about quality? A key feature of banks is that managers learn about project quality from bad news, i.e., a default. We show that in such an environment, distortions tend to increase with expected quality and imperfect information about quality. Results differ if managers instead learn from good news.