Multidimensional Reasoning in Games: Framework, Equilibrium, and Applications

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
• 署名单位: Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; New York University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170322
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 285-318
• 关键词: colonel-blotto; incentives; models

摘要

We develop a framework for analyzing multidimensional reasoning in strategic interactions, which is motivated by two experimental findings: (i) in games with a large and complex strategy space, players tend to think in terms of strategy characteristics rather than the strategies themselves; (ii) in their strategic deliberation, players consider one characteristic at a time. A multidimensional equilibrium is a vector of characteristics representing a stable mode of behavior: a player does not wish to modify any one characteristic. The concept is applied to several economic interactions, where a vector of characteristics, rather than a distribution of strategies, is identified as stable.