A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambrus, Attila; Baranovskyi, Volodymyr; Kolb, Aaron
• 署名单位: Duke University; University of Rochester; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190008
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 373-419
• 关键词: Cheap talk; INFORMATION; COMMUNICATION; PARTIES

摘要

We investigate information aggregation and competition in a delegation framework. An uninformed principal is unable to perform a task herself and must choose between one of two biased and imperfectly informed experts. In the focal equilibrium, experts exaggerate their biases, anticipating an ideological winner's curse. We show that having a second expert can benefit the principal, even when equally or more biased than the first expert. The principal can benefit from commitment to an element of surprise and prefers experts with equal rather than opposite biases.