Vertical Agreements and User Access

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gaudin, Germain; White, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of Freiburg; IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris; Tsinghua University; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180339
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 328-371
• 关键词: ad-valorem; indirect taxes; agency model; unit taxes; books

摘要

Platforms acting as sales channels for producers often charge users for access via a subscription fee or a markup on hardware. We compare two common forms of vertical pricing agreement that platforms use with sellers: per unit and proportional fees. In particular, we analyze the critical role that user access plays on prices, profits, and welfare under both forms of agreement. We characterize this role and show how it potentially overturns standard results saying that proportional fees lead to lower prices and higher profits.