A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji
• 署名单位: National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200411
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 288-322
• 关键词: players models; COMMUNICATION; Consistency; investments; MARKETS; core

摘要

We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents' information structure, requires (i) indi-vidual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents' information leads to another stable state. (JEL C78, D83)