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作者：Hatchondo, Juan Carlos; Martinez, Leonardo; Sosa-Padilla, Cesar
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; International Monetary Fund; McMaster University
摘要：We measure the effects of debt dilution on sovereign default risk and study debt covenants that could mitigate these effects. We calibrate a baseline model with endogenous debt duration and default risk (in which debt can be diluted) using data from Spain. We find that debt dilution accounts for 78 percent of the default risk in the baseline economy and that eliminating dilution increases the optimal duration of sovereign debt by almost 2 years. Eliminating dilution also increases consumption ...
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作者：Schmitt-Grohe, Stephanie; Uribe, Martin
作者单位：Columbia University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：This paper analyzes the inefficiencies arising from the combination of fixed exchange rates, nominal rigidity, and free capital mobility. We document that nominal wages are downwardly rigid in emerging countries. We develop an open-economy model that incorporates this friction. The model predicts that the combination of a currency peg and free capital mobility creates a negative externality that causes over-borrowing during booms and high unemployment during contractions. Optimal capital contr...
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作者：Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad O.
作者单位：Tilburg University; University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We study how an improvement in market transparency affects seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior in a market setting that involves informational asymmetries. The improvement was achieved by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings. It led to a significant increase in buyer satisfaction with seller performance, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting-a reduction in adverse selection-and staying but improving behavior-a reduction in moral hazard-...
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作者：Algan, Yann; Hemet, Camille; Laitin, David D.
作者单位：Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Stanford University
摘要：Relying on diversity measures computed at the apartment block level under conditions of exogenous allocation of public housing in France, this paper identifies the effects of ethnic diversity on social relationships and housing quality. Housing Survey data reveal that diversity induces social anomie. Through the channel of anomie, diversity accounts for the inability of residents to sanction others for vandalism and to act collectively to demand proper building maintenance. However, anomie als...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Dechezlepretre, Antoine; Hemous, David; Martin, Ralf; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; INSEAD Business School; Imperial College London; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Can directed technical change be used to combat climate change? We construct new firm-level panel data on auto industry innovation distinguishing between dirty (internal combustion engine) and clean (e.g., electric, hybrid, and hydrogen) patents across 80 countries over several decades. We show that firms tend to innovate more in clean (and less in dirty) technologies when they face higher tax-inclusive fuel prices. Furthermore, there is path dependence in the type of innovation (clean/dirty) ...
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作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Leshno, Jacob D.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Microsoft; Microsoft India; Columbia University
摘要：This paper develops a price-theoretic framework for matching markets with heterogeneous preferences. The model departs from the Gale and Shapley model by assuming that a finite number of agents on one side (colleges) are matched to a continuum of agents on the other side (students). We show that stable matchings correspond to solutions of supply and demand equations, with the selectivity of each college playing a role similar to that of prices. We apply the model to an analysis of how competit...
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作者：Boissay, Frederic; Collard, Fabrice; Smets, Frank
作者单位：Bank for International Settlements (BIS); University of Bern; European Central Bank; KU Leuven
摘要：Banking crises are rare events that break out in the midst of credit-intensive booms and bring about deep and long-lasting recessions. This paper presents a textbook dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to explain these phenomena. The model features a nontrivial banking sector, where bank heterogeneity gives rise to an interbank market. Moral hazard and asymmetric information in this market may lead to sudden market freezes, banking crises, credit crunches, and severe financial recessi...
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作者：Horner, Johannes; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University
摘要：A firm considers hiring an agent who may be competent for a potential project or not. The agent can prove her competence but faces a holdup problem. We propose a model of persuasion and show how gradualism helps mitigate the holdup problem. We show when it is optimal to give away part of the information at the beginning of the bargaining and sell the remainder in dribs and drabs. The agent can appropriate only part of the value of information. Introducing a third party allows her to extract th...
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作者：Kaplan, Greg; Menzio, Guido
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We propose a theory of self-fulfilling unemployment fluctuations. When a firm increases its workforce, it raises demand and weakens competition facing other firms, as employed workers spend more and have less time to search for low prices than unemployed workers. These effects induce other firms to hire more labor in order to scale up their presence in the product market. The feedback between employment and product market conditions generates multiple equilibriaand the possibility of self-fulf...
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作者：Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Princeton University; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); National Bureau of Economic Research; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：To analyze the impact of labor market competition on the structure of compensation, we embed multitasking and screening within a Hotelling framework. Competition for talent leads to an escalation of performance pay, shifting effort away from long-term investments, risk management, and cooperation. Efficiency losses can exceed those from a single principal, who dulls incentives to extract rents. As competition intensifies, monopsonistic underincentivization of low-skill agents first decreases a...
