Market Transparency, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Klein, Tobias J.; Lambertz, Christian; Stahl, Konrad O.
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; University of Mannheim; University of Mannheim; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/688875
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1677-1713
• 关键词: Reputation; ebay; auctions; INFORMATION; disclosure; QUALITY; SYSTEM; trust

摘要

We study how an improvement in market transparency affects seller exit and continuing sellers' behavior in a market setting that involves informational asymmetries. The improvement was achieved by reducing strategic bias in buyer ratings. It led to a significant increase in buyer satisfaction with seller performance, but not to an increase in seller exit. When sellers had the choice between exiting-a reduction in adverse selection-and staying but improving behavior-a reduction in moral hazard-they preferred the latter. Increasing market transparency led to better market outcomes.