Booms and Banking Crises

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boissay, Frederic; Collard, Fabrice; Smets, Frank
• 署名单位: Bank for International Settlements (BIS); University of Bern; European Central Bank; KU Leuven
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/685475
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 489-538
• 关键词: Financial crises; monetary-policy; credit booms; imbalances; MODEL

摘要

Banking crises are rare events that break out in the midst of credit-intensive booms and bring about deep and long-lasting recessions. This paper presents a textbook dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to explain these phenomena. The model features a nontrivial banking sector, where bank heterogeneity gives rise to an interbank market. Moral hazard and asymmetric information in this market may lead to sudden market freezes, banking crises, credit crunches, and severe financial recessions. Those recessions follow credit booms and are not necessarily triggered by large exogenous adverse shocks.