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作者：Mourifie, Ismael; Henry, Marc; Meango, Romuald
作者单位：University of Toronto; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Max Planck Society
摘要：We analyze the empirical content of the Roy model, stripped down to sector-specific unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection on the basis of potential outcomes. We characterize sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes and testable implications of the Roy model. We apply these bounds to derive a measure of departure from Roy self-selection, so as to identify prime targets for intervention. Special emphasis is put on the case of binary outcomes. We analyze a Roy model of c...
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作者：Grennan, Matthew; Swanson, Ashley
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：Using data on hospitals' purchases across a large number of important product categories, we find that access to information on purchasing by peer hospitals leads to reductions in the prices hospitals negotiate for supplies. These effects are concentrated among hospitals previously paying relatively high prices for brands purchased in large volumes. Evidence from coronary stents suggests that transparency allows hospitals to resolve asymmetric information problems, but savings are limited in p...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Oslo
摘要：In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelection. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are weak, in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also show that political economy considerations lead to ov...
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作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Deng, Alex; Montiel Olea, Jose Luis; Rao, Justin; Weyl, E. Glen
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Microsoft; Columbia University; Microsoft; Princeton University
摘要：We propose a new framework for optimal experimentation, which we term the A/B testing problem. Our model departs from the existing literature by allowing for fat tails. Our key insight is that the optimal strategy depends on whether most gains accrue from typical innovations or from rare, unpredictable large successes. If the tails of the unobserved distribution of innovation quality are not too fat, the standard approach of using a few high-powered big experiments is optimal. However, if the ...
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作者：Somaini, Paulo
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper provides a nonparametric identification result for procurement models with asymmetric bidders, dependent private information, and interdependent costs. For risk-neutral bidders, the model's payoff-relevant primitives are the joint distribution of private information and each bidder's full-information expected cost. The joint distribution of bids identifies the joint distribution of signals. First-order conditions identify the expected cost conditional on tying with at least one comp...
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作者：Bidwell, Kelly; Casey, Katherine; Glennerster, Rachel
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Candidate debates have a rich history and remain integral to contemporary campaign strategy. There is, however, little evidence that they affect the behavior of voters or politicians. The scarcity of political information in the developing world offers an attractive testing ground. Using experimental variation in Sierra Leone, we find that public debate screenings build political knowledge that changes the way people vote, which induces a campaign expenditure response by candidates and fosters...
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作者：Allen, Treb; Arkolakis, Costas; Takahashi, Yuta
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study the theoretical properties and counterfactual predictions of a large class of general equilibrium trade and economic geography models. By combining aggregate factor supply and demand functions with market-clearing conditions, we prove that existence, uniqueness, and-given observed trade flows-the counterfactual predictions of any model within this class depend only on the demand and supply elasticities (gravity constants). Using a new model-implied instrumental variables approach, we ...
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作者：McGuirk, Eoin; Burke, Marshall
作者单位：Tufts University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study the impact of global food price shocks on local violence across Africa. In food-producing areas, higher prices reduce conflict over the control of territory (factor conflict) and increase conflict over the appropriation of surplus (output conflict). We argue that this difference arises because higher prices increase the opportunity cost of soldiering for producers while simultaneously inducing consumers to appropriate surplus as real wages fall. In areas without crop agriculture, high...
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作者：Caucutt, Elizabeth M.; Lochner, Lance
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a dynastic human capital investment framework to study the importance of family borrowing constraints and uninsured labor market risk, as well as the process of intergenerational ability transmission, in determining human capital investments in children at different ages. We calibrate our model to data from the Children of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. While the effects of relaxing any borrowing limit at a single stage are modest, eliminating all life-cycle borrowing li...
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作者：Milgrom, Paul; Segal, Ilya
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study the class of multiround, multiproduct clock procurement auctions that reduce offered prices at each round. When prices stop declining, the remaining bidders become the winning sellers. For single-minded bidders, each such auction has five properties not shared by Vickrey auctions: each is obviously strategy-proof and group-strategy-proof, sets prices that are Nash equilibrium winning bids in the related first-price auction, preserves winner privacy about values, and can be extended to...
