Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Grennan, Matthew; Swanson, Ashley
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/705329
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 1234-1268
• 关键词: empirical-evidence; care; QUALITY; equilibrium; dispersion; retail; COSTS

摘要

Using data on hospitals' purchases across a large number of important product categories, we find that access to information on purchasing by peer hospitals leads to reductions in the prices hospitals negotiate for supplies. These effects are concentrated among hospitals previously paying relatively high prices for brands purchased in large volumes. Evidence from coronary stents suggests that transparency allows hospitals to resolve asymmetric information problems, but savings are limited in part by the stickiness of contracts in business-to-business settings. Savings are largest for physician preference items, where high-price, high-quantity hospital-brand combinations average 3.9% savings, versus 1.6% for commodities.