The Political Economy of Weak Treaties

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Battaglini, Marco; Harstad, Bard
• 署名单位: Cornell University; University of Oslo
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/704610
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 544-590
• 关键词: international environmental agreements; policy cooperation; UNITED-STATES; PARTICIPATION; DEMOCRACY; PROTECTION; protocol

摘要

In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelection. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are weak, in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also show that political economy considerations lead to overambitious treaties that rely too much on technology instead of sanctions to motivate compliance. Our theory can rationalize several puzzles associated with treaties.