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作者：Cooper, Zack; Scott Morton, Fiona; Shekita, Nathan
作者单位：Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：In the United States, hospitals and physicians independently negotiate contracts with insurers. Therefore, a privately insured individual can be treated at an in-network hospital's emergency department but receive a large unexpected bill from an out-of-network emergency physician working at that facility. Because patients do not choose their emergency physician, emergency physicians can remain out of network and charge high prices without losing patient volume. We illustrate that this strong o...
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作者：Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel; Wieland, Johannes
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of California System; University of California San Diego; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：We revisit an old question: does industry labor reallocation affect the business cycle? Our empirical methodology exploits variation in a local labor market's exposure to industry reallocation on the basis of the area's initial industry composition and national industry employment trends for identification. Applied to confidential employment data over 1980-2014, we find sharp evidence of reallocation contributing to higher local area unemployment if it occurs during a national recession but li...
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作者：Monras, Joan
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：How does the US labor market absorb low-skilled immigration? In the short run, high-immigration locations see their low-skilled labor force increase, native low-skilled wages decrease, and the relative price of rentals increase. Internal relocation dissipates this shock spatially. In the long run, the only lasting consequences are (a) worse labor market conditions for low-skilled natives who entered the labor force in high-immigration years, and (b) lower housing prices in high-immigrant locat...
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作者：Harstad, Bard
作者单位：University of Oslo
摘要：Policy makers have time-inconsistent preferences if they fear losing power or are endowed with hyperbolic discount factors. Politicians may thus seek to influence future policy choices, for example, by investing in green technologies that motivate later politicians to act sustainably. I show that optimal investment subsidies are larger for technologies that are strategic complements to future investments, that are further upstream in the supply chain, or that are characterized by longer maturi...
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作者：Mathevet, Laurent; Perego, Jacopo; Taneva, Ina
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University; University of Edinburgh
摘要：Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents' beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents' beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. F...
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作者：Enke, Benjamin
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies the supply of and demand for moral values in recent US presidential elections. Using a combination of large-scale survey data and text analyses, I find support for the hypothesis that both voters and politicians exhibit heterogeneity in their emphasis on universalist relative to communal moral values and that politicians' vote shares partly reflect the extent to which their moral appeal matches the values of the electorate. Over the last decade, Americans' values have become...
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作者：Fang, Dawei; Noe, Thomas; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：University of Gothenburg; University of Oxford; Yale University
摘要：We study contests in which contestants are homogeneous and have convex effort costs. Increasing contest competitiveness, by making prizes more unequal, scaling up the competition, or adding new contestants, always discourages effort. These results have significant implications: although often criticized as evidence of laxity or cronyism, muting competition (e.g., adopting softer grading curves or less high-powered promotion systems) can both reduce inequality and increase output. Holding promo...
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作者：Berry, James; Fischer, Greg; Guiteras, Raymond P.
作者单位：University of Delaware; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; North Carolina State University
摘要：We use the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for and heterogeneous impacts of clean water technology through a field experiment in Ghana. Although WTP is low relative to cost, demand is inelastic at low prices. Short-run treatment effects are positive throughout the WTP distribution. After 1 year, use and benefits are both increasing in WTP, with negative effects on low-WTP households. Combining estimated treatment effects with households' WTP implies...
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作者：Cavounidis, Costas; Lang, Kevin
作者单位：University of Warwick; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We provide microfoundations for dynamic skill formation with a model of investment in multiple skills, when jobs place different weights on skills. We show that credit constraints may affect investment even when workers do not exhaust their credit. Firms may invest in their workers' skills even when there are many similar competitors. Firm and worker incentives can lead to overinvestment. Optimal skill accumulation resembles-but is not-learning by doing. An example shows that shocks to skill p...
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作者：Exley, Christine L.; Niederle, Muriel; Vesterlund, Lise
作者单位：Harvard University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Women's reluctance to negotiate is often used to explain the gender wage gap, popularizing the push for women to lean in and negotiate more. Examining an environment in which women achieve positive profits when they choose to negotiate, we find that increased negotiations are not helpful. Women know when to ask: they enter negotiations resulting in positive profits and avoid negotiations resulting in negative profits. While the findings are similar for men, we find no evidence that men are mor...
