-
作者：Narita, Yusuke
作者单位：Yale University; Yale University
摘要：This note points out that the proof of Theorem 1, the main theorem, in Ergin (2002) needs two corrections. We provide two counterexamples to Ergin's (2002) proof and show that the theorem holds as it is by providing an alternative proof.
-
作者：Baley, Isaac; Blanco, Andres
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Centre de Recerca en Economia Internacional (CREI); Barcelona School of Economics; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：How does an economy's capital respond to aggregate productivity shocks when firms make lumpy investments? We show that capital's transitional dynamics are structurally linked to two steady-state moments: the dispersion of capital to productivity ratios-an indicator of capital misallocation-and the covariance of capital to productivity ratios with the time elapsed since their last adjustment-an indicator of asymmetric costs of upsizing and downsizing the capital stock. We compute these two suff...
-
作者：Comin, Diego; Lashkari, Danial; Mestieri, Marti
作者单位：Dartmouth College; Boston College; Northwestern University
摘要：We present a new multi-sector growth model that features nonhomothetic, constant elasticity of substitution preferences, and accommodates long-run demand and supply drivers of structural change for an arbitrary number of sectors. The model is consistent with the decline in agriculture, the hump-shaped evolution of manufacturing, and the rise of services over time. We estimate the demand system derived from the model using household-level data from the United States and India, as well as histor...
-
作者：Gossner, Olivier; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Zurich; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Charles University Prague; University of Toronto
摘要：We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a decision-maker who learns sequentially about a number of items before making a choice. Under natural assumptions on the decision-maker's strategy, directing attention toward one item increases its likelihood of being chosen regardless of its value. This result applies when the decision-maker can reject all items in favor of an outside option with known value; if no outside option is available, the direction of the effect of manipulation de...
-
作者：Onatski, Alexei; Wang, Chen
作者单位：University of Cambridge; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper draws parallels between the principal components analysis of factorless high-dimensional nonstationary data and the classical spurious regression. We show that a few of the principal components of such data absorb nearly all the data variation. The corresponding scree plot suggests that the data contain a few factors, which is corroborated by the standard panel information criteria. Furthermore, the Dickey-Fuller tests of the unit root hypothesis applied to the estimated idiosyncrat...
-
作者：Auclert, Adrien; Bardoczy, Bence; Rognlie, Matthew; Straub, Ludwig
作者单位：Stanford University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Northwestern University; Harvard University
摘要：We propose a general and highly efficient method for solving and estimating general equilibrium heterogeneous-agent models with aggregate shocks in discrete time. Our approach relies on the rapid computation of sequence-space Jacobians-the derivatives of perfect-foresight equilibrium mappings between aggregate sequences around the steady state. Our main contribution is a fast algorithm for calculating Jacobians for a large class of heterogeneous-agent problems. We combine this algorithm with a...
-
作者：Szeidl, Adam; Szucs, Ferenc
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Stockholm University
摘要：We use data from Hungary to establish two results about the relationship between the government and the media. (i) We document large advertising favors from the government to connected media, and large corruption coverage favors from connected media to the government. Our empirical strategy exploits sharp reallocations around changes in media ownership and other events to rule out market-based explanations. (ii) Under the assumptions of a structural model, we distinguish between owner ideology...
-
作者：Board, Simon; Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper proposes a tractable model of Bayesian learning on large random networks where agents choose whether to adopt an innovation. We study the impact of the network structure on learning dynamics and product diffusion. In directed networks, all direct and indirect links contribute to agents' learning. In comparison, learning and welfare are lower in undirected networks and networks with cliques. In a rich class of networks, behavior is described by a small number of differential equation...
-
作者：Levine, David K.
作者单位：European University Institute; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Few want to do business with a partner who has a bad reputation. Consequently, once a bad reputation is established, it can be difficult to get rid of. This leads on the one hand to the intuitive idea that a good reputation is easy to lose and hard to gain. On the other hand, it can lead to a strong form of history dependence in which a single beneficial or adverse event can cast a shadow over a very long period of time. It gives rise to a reputational trap where an agent rationally chooses no...
-
作者：Gottlieb, Daniel; Zhang, Xingtan
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：We study contracts between naive present-biased consumers and risk-neutral firms. We show that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon grows. This is true both when bargaining power is on the consumers' and on the firms' side, when consumers cannot commit to long-term contracts, and when firms do not know the consumers' naivete. However, the welfare loss from present bias does not vanish when firms do not know the consumers' present bias or when they cannot offer...
