-
作者：Ales, Laurence; Sleet, Christopher
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; University of Rochester
摘要：Discrete location, occupation, skill, and hours choices of workers underpin their incomes. This paper analyzes the optimal taxation of discrete income-generating choice. It derives optimal tax equations and Pareto test inequalities for mixed logit choice environments that can accommodate discrete and unstructured choice sets, rich preference heterogeneity, and complex aggregate cross-substitution patterns between choices. These equations explicitly connect optimal taxes to societal redistribut...
-
作者：Frechette, Guillaume R.; Lizzeri, Alessandro; Perego, Jacopo
作者单位：New York University; Princeton University; Columbia University
摘要：We study the role of commitment in communication and its interactions with rules, which determine whether information is verifiable. Our framework nests models of cheap talk, information disclosure, and Bayesian persuasion. It predicts that commitment has opposite effects on information transmission under the two alternative rules. We leverage these contrasting forces to experimentally establish that subjects react to commitment in line with the main qualitative implications of the theory. Qua...
-
作者：Doval, Laura; Skreta, Vasiliki
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of London; University College London
摘要：We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of any equilibrium in a mechanism-selection game between an uninformed designer and a privately informed agent. A cornerstone of our methodology is the idea that a mechanism should encode not only the rules that determine the allocation, but also the information ...
-
作者：Norets, Andriy; Pelenis, Justinas
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：We consider nonparametric estimation of a mixed discrete-continuous distribution under anisotropic smoothness conditions and a possibly increasing number of support points for the discrete part of the distribution. For these settings, we derive lower bounds on the estimation rates. Next, we consider a nonparametric mixture of normals model that uses continuous latent variables for the discrete part of the observations. We show that the posterior in this model contracts at rates that are equal ...
-
作者：Elliott, Graham; Kudrin, Nikolay; Wuthrich, Kaspar
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We theoretically analyze the problem of testing for p-hacking based on distributions of p-values across multiple studies. We provide general results for when such distributions have testable restrictions (are non-increasing) under the null of no p-hacking. We find novel additional testable restrictions for p-values based on t-tests. Specifically, the shape of the power functions results in both complete monotonicity as well as bounds on the distribution of p-values. These testable restrictions...
-
作者：Sentana, Enrique
-
作者：Chen, Chia-Hui; Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Osaka; University of Hong Kong
摘要：This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where the indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single-crossing property fails to hold. Equilibrium exhibits a threshold type below which types choose actions that are fully revealing and above which they pool in a pairwise fashion, with a gap separating the actions chosen by these two sets of types. The result...
-
作者：Carlana, Michela; La Ferrara, Eliana; Pinotti, Paolo
作者单位：Harvard University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
-
作者：Sinander, Ludvig
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：I prove an envelope theorem with a converse: the envelope formula is equivalent to a first-order condition. Like Milgrom and Segal's (2002) envelope theorem, my result requires no structure on the choice set. I use the converse envelope theorem to extend to general outcomes and preferences the canonical result in mechanism design that any increasing allocation is implementable, and apply this to selling information.
-
作者：Dworczak, Piotr; Pavan, Alessandro
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We propose a robust solution concept for Bayesian persuasion that accounts for the Sender's concern that her Bayesian belief about the environment-which we call the conjecture-may be false. Specifically, the Sender is uncertain about the exogenous sources of information the Receivers may learn from, and about strategy selection. She first identifies all information policies that yield the largest payoff in the worst-case scenario, that is, when Nature provides information and coordinates the R...
