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作者：Mckay, Alisdair; Wieland, Johannes F.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The prevailing neo-Wicksellian view holds that the central bank's objective is to track the natural rate of interest (r*), which itself is largely exogenous to monetary policy. We challenge this view using a fixed-cost model of durable consumption demand, in which expansionary monetary policy prompts households to accelerate purchases of durable goods. This yields an intertemporal trade-off in aggregate demand as encouraging households to increase durable holdings today leaves fewer households...
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作者：Kleiner, Andreas; Moldovanu, Benny; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; University of Bonn; Yale University
摘要：We characterize the set of extreme points of monotonic functions that are either majorized by a given function f or themselves majorize f and show that these extreme points play a crucial role in many economic design problems. Our main results show that each extreme point is uniquely characterized by a countable collection of intervals. Outside these intervals the extreme point equals the original function f and inside the function is constant. Further consistency conditions need to be satisfi...
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作者：Azar, Jose; Vives, Xavier
作者单位：University of Navarra; University of Navarra; IESE Business School
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作者：Masten, Matthew A.; Poirier, Alexandre
作者单位：Duke University; Georgetown University
摘要：What should researchers do when their baseline model is falsified? We recommend reporting the set of parameters that are consistent with minimally nonfalsified models. We call this the falsification adaptive set (FAS). This set generalizes the standard baseline estimand to account for possible falsification. Importantly, it does not require the researcher to select or calibrate sensitivity parameters. In the classical linear IV model with multiple instruments, we show that the FAS has a simple...
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作者：Kaji, Tetsuya
作者单位：University of Chicago
摘要：We provide general formulation of weak identification in semiparametric models and an efficiency concept. Weak identification occurs when a parameter is weakly regular, that is, when it is locally homogeneous of degree zero. When this happens, consistent or equivariant estimation is shown to be impossible. We then show that there exists an underlying regular parameter that fully characterizes the weakly regular parameter. While this parameter is not unique, concepts of sufficiency and minimali...
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作者：Kono, Haruki; Kandori, Michihiro
作者单位：University of Tokyo
摘要：In their analysis of strategic information transmission, Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982) showed the existence of partition equilibria (Theorem 1). Although the theorem itself is correct, the proof contains some incorrect statements. We present a counter-example and provide a correct version of the proof.
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作者：Kline, Patrick; Walters, Christopher
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper develops methods for detecting discrimination by individual employers using correspondence experiments that send fictitious resumes to real job openings. We establish identification of higher moments of the distribution of job-level callback rates as a function of the number of resumes sent to each job and propose shape-constrained estimators of these moments. Applying our methods to three experimental data sets, we find striking job-level heterogeneity in the extent to which callba...
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作者：Wilson, Robert B.
作者单位：Stanford University
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作者：Dworczak, Piotr; Kominers, Scott Duke; Akbarpour, Mohammad
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Policymakers frequently use price regulations as a response to inequality in the markets they control. In this paper, we examine the optimal structure of such policies from the perspective of mechanism design. We study a buyer-seller market in which agents have private information about both their valuations for an indivisible object and their marginal utilities for money. The planner seeks a mechanism that maximizes agents' total utilities, subject to incentive and market-clearing constraints...
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作者：Peivandi, Ahmad; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; University of Pennsylvania; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Centralized markets reduce search for buyers and sellers. Their thickness increases the chance of order execution at nearly competitive prices. In spite of the incentives to consolidate, some markets, securities markets and on-line advertising being the most notable, are fragmented into multiple trading venues. We argue that fragmentation is an inevitable feature of any centralized market except in special circumstances.
