Long-Term Contracting With Time-Inconsistent Agents
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Gottlieb, Daniel; Zhang, Xingtan
署名单位：
University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
刊物名称：
ECONOMETRICA
ISSN/ISSBN：
0012-9682
DOI：
10.3982/ECTA17126
发表日期：
2021
页码：
793-824
关键词：
摘要：
We study contracts between naive present-biased consumers and risk-neutral firms. We show that the welfare loss from present bias vanishes as the contracting horizon grows. This is true both when bargaining power is on the consumers' and on the firms' side, when consumers cannot commit to long-term contracts, and when firms do not know the consumers' naivete. However, the welfare loss from present bias does not vanish when firms do not know the consumers' present bias or when they cannot offer exclusive contracts.
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