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作者：Inoue, Atsushi; Kilian, Lutz
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Dallas; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We provide evidence that the quantitative importance of the Haar prior for posterior impulse response inference has been overstated. How sensitive posterior inference is to the Haar prior depends on the width of the identified set. This width depends not only on how much the identified set is narrowed by the identifying restrictions but also on the data through the reduced-form model parameters. Hence, the role of the Haar prior can be assessed only on a case-by-case basis. We show by example ...
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作者：Eusepi, Stefano; Giannoni, Marc; Preston, Bruce
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Barclays; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper provides theory and evidence that distorted long-term interest rate expectations limit the effectiveness of monetary policy. Beliefs that depart from rational expectations break the tight link between policy rates and long-term interest rates, even when determined by the expectations hypothesis of the yield curve. Because long-term expectations are excessively sensitive to short-term interest rates, optimal policy is less aggressive relative to rational expectations. More aggressive...
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作者：Rodriguez-Clare, Andres; Ulate, Mauricio; Vasquez, Jose P.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We present a dynamic quantitative trade and migration model that incorporates downward nominal wage rigidities and show how this framework can generate changes in unemployment and labor participation that match those uncovered by the empirical literature studying the China shock. We find that the China shock leads to average welfare increases in most US states, including many that experience unemployment during the transition. However, nominal rigidities reduce the overall US gains by around t...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Heumann, Tibor; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Yale University; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We analyze a nonlinear pricing model where the seller controls both product pricing (screening) and buyer information about their own values (persuasion). We prove that the optimal mechanism always consists of finitely many signals and items, even with a continuum of buyer values. The seller optimally pools buyer values and reduces product variety to minimize informational rents. We show that value pooling is optimal even for finite value distributions if their entropy exceeds a critical thres...
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作者：Pycia, Marek; Woodward, Kyle
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Pay-as-bid (or discriminatory or multiple-price) auctions are used to sell homogenous goods, such as treasury securities and commodities. We prove the uniqueness of their pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and establish a tractable representation of equilibrium bids for symmetrically informed bidders. Analyzing design, we show that supply transparency and full disclosure are revenue maximizing in pay-as-bid, though not necessarily in uniform-price (or single-price), auctions-the main alte...
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作者：Harrison, Glenn W.; Ross, Don; Swarthout, J. Todd
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia State University; University of Cape Town; University College Cork
摘要：The measurement of intelligence should identify and measure an individual's subjective confidence that a response to a test question is correct. Existing measures do not do that, nor do they use extrinsic financial incentive for truthful responses. We rectify both issues and show that each matters for the measurement of intelligence, particularly for women. Our results on gender and confidence in the face of risk have wider applications in terms of the measurement of competitiveness and financ...
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作者：Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how incentives interact with honor and stigma, deriving optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society's values and when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents' willingness to contribute to the public good and toughened when it signals ...
