Laws and Norms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean
• 署名单位: Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/738343
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: social norms; Pluralistic ignorance; MORAL SENTIMENTS; public-goods; alcohol-use; incentives; SANCTIONS; signal; institutions; preferences

摘要

We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how incentives interact with honor and stigma, deriving optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society's values and when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents' willingness to contribute to the public good and toughened when it signals social externalities. We also shed light on norms-based interventions, societies' resistance to economists' messages, and the avoidance of cruel and unusual punishments.