A Case for Pay-as-Bid Auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Pycia, Marek; Woodward, Kyle
• 署名单位: University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/738341
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: discontinuous economic games; PURE-STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA; divisible good auctions; UNIFORM PRICE AUCTIONS; multiunit auctions; information acquisition; Linkage principle; Nash equilibria; EXISTENCE; revenue

摘要

Pay-as-bid (or discriminatory or multiple-price) auctions are used to sell homogenous goods, such as treasury securities and commodities. We prove the uniqueness of their pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and establish a tractable representation of equilibrium bids for symmetrically informed bidders. Analyzing design, we show that supply transparency and full disclosure are revenue maximizing in pay-as-bid, though not necessarily in uniform-price (or single-price), auctions-the main alternative auction format. Pay as bid raises weakly more revenue than uniform price and may lead to higher welfare. Our results provide an explanation for the revenue equivalence observed in empirical studies of treasury auctions.