Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Strack, Philipp; Zhang, Mengxi
署名单位:
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; Yale University
刊物名称:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0002-8282
DOI:
10.1257/aer.20221247
发表日期:
2023
页码:
2581-2614
关键词:
ESTIMATING RISK PREFERENCES
expected-utility
disappointment
CHOICE
MARKETS
aversion
Heterogeneity
equilibrium
uncertainty
INFORMATION
摘要:
We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance prob-lem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses , possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains pat-terns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance con-tracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with cov-erage limits-premium pairs. A main departure from the classical insurance literature is obtained here by endowing the agents with risk-averse preferences that can be represented by a dual utility func-tional (Yaari 1987). (JEL D81, D82, D86, D91, G22)