Signaling and Discrimination in Collaborative Projects

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Onuchic, Paula; Ray, Debraj
• 署名单位: University of Oxford; New York University; University of Warwick
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211729
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 210-252
• 关键词: gender-differences; ECONOMICS; RECOGNITION; incentives; reputation; committees

摘要

We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) proj-ects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influ-ence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collabo-ration to small biases in the public's credit assignment. When collab-orators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile equilibria individuals receive asymmetric collaborative credit based on payoff-irrelevant identities. We study payoff dis-tributions across identities within asymmetric equilibria, and com-pare aggregate welfare across symmetric and asymmetric equilibria. (JEL A11, D82, I23)