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作者：Chari, V. V.; Dovis, Alessandro; Kehoe, Patrick J.
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Pennsylvania; Stanford University; University of London; University College London
摘要：When is financial repression-namely, policies that force banks to hold government debt-optimal? With commitment, such policies are never optimal because they crowd out banks' productive investments. Without commitment, they are optimal when governments need to issue unusually large amounts of debt, such as during wartime. In such times, repression allows governments to credibly issue more debt. Repression increases credibility because when banks hold government debt, defaults dilute net worth,...
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作者：Calsamiglia, Caterina; Fu, Chao; Guell, Maia
作者单位：ICREA; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Edinburgh; IZA Institute Labor Economics
摘要：We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types, using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM in Barcelona to the deferred-acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by eur...
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作者：Kosse, Fabian; Deckers, Thomas; Pinger, Pia; Schildberg-Hoerisch, Hannah; Falk, Armin
作者单位：University of Munich; University of Bonn; University of Bonn
摘要：This study presents evidence on the role of social environment for the formation of prosociality. We show that socioeconomic status (SES) as well as intensity of mother-child interaction and mothers' prosocial attitudes are related to elementary school children's prosociality. We also present evidence on a randomly assigned variation of the social environment, providing children with a mentor for 1 year. Our data reveal a significant and persistent increase in prosociality in the treatment rel...
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作者：Herrera, Helios; Ordonez, Guillermo; Trebesch, Christoph
作者单位：University of Warwick; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut
摘要：Political booms, measured by the rise in governments' popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond better known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We argue that governments in developing countries have stronger incentives to ride unsound credit booms in order to boost their popularity, rather than implementing corrective policies that could prevent crises but are politically costly. We provide evidence of t...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and provides information over time. The optimal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy. If the task is indeed difficult, the agent is told this only after working long enough to put the difficult task ...
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作者：Ashraf, Nava; Bau, Natalie; Nunn, Nathan; Voena, Alessandra
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：We document an important consequence of bride price, a payment made by the groom to the bride's family at marriage. Revisiting Indonesia's school construction program, we find that among ethnic groups without the custom, it had no effect on girls' schooling. Among ethnic groups with the custom, it had large positive effects. We show (theoretically and empirically) that this is because a daughter's education, by increasing the amount of money parents receive at marriage, generates an additional...
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作者：Ciscato, Edoardo; Galichon, Alfred; Gousse, Marion
作者单位：KU Leuven; New York University; Laval University
摘要：In this paper, we extend Gary Becker's empirical analysis of the marriage market to same-sex couples. We build an equilibrium model of the same-sex marriage market that allows for straightforward identification of the gains of marriage. We estimate the model with 2008-12 American Community Survey data on California and find that positive assortative mating is weaker for same-sex couples than for different-sex couples with respect to age and race. Positive assortative mating on education is str...
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作者：Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer's distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer's equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trade is ex post efficient. These properties are sho...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Oslo
摘要：In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelection. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are weak, in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also show that political economy considerations lead to ov...
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作者：Allen, Treb; Arkolakis, Costas; Takahashi, Yuta
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Yale University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：We study the theoretical properties and counterfactual predictions of a large class of general equilibrium trade and economic geography models. By combining aggregate factor supply and demand functions with market-clearing conditions, we prove that existence, uniqueness, and-given observed trade flows-the counterfactual predictions of any model within this class depend only on the demand and supply elasticities (gravity constants). Using a new model-implied instrumental variables approach, we ...
