Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Calsamiglia, Caterina; Fu, Chao; Guell, Maia
• 署名单位: ICREA; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Edinburgh; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/704573
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 642-680
• 关键词: quality; admissions; demand; equilibrium; COMPETITION; priorities; program; interim

摘要

We model household choice of schools under the Boston mechanism (BM) and develop a new method, applicable to a broad class of mechanisms, to fully solve the choice problem even if it is infeasible via the traditional method. We estimate the joint distribution of household preferences and sophistication types, using administrative data from Barcelona. Counterfactual policy analyses show that a change from BM in Barcelona to the deferred-acceptance mechanism would decrease average welfare by euro1,020, while a change to the top-trading-cycles mechanism would increase average welfare by euro460.