Information Design in the Holdup Problem
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balazs
署名单位：
University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-3808
DOI：
10.1086/704574
发表日期：
2020
页码：
681-709
关键词：
摘要：
We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer's distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer's equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trade is ex post efficient. These properties are shown to be preserved even when different distributions are differentially costly as long as the cost is monotone in the dispersion of the distribution.