Moving the Goalposts

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ely, Jeffrey C.; Szydlowski, Martin
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/704387
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 468-506
• 关键词: APPRENTICESHIP; DESIGN

摘要

We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and provides information over time. The optimal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy. If the task is indeed difficult, the agent is told this only after working long enough to put the difficult task within reach. The agent then completes the difficult task even though he never would have chosen to at the outset.