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作者：Costello, Anna M.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：How do shocks to the banking sector travel through the corporate economy? Using a novel data set of interfirm sales, I show that suppliers exposed to a large and exogenous decline in bank financing pass this liquidity shock to their downstream customers. The spillover effect occurs through two channels: a reduction in trade credit offered and a reduction in the total supply of goods and services. After exposure to the spillover, downstream customers show a spike in credit risk and a reduction ...
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作者：Gandhi, Amit; Navarro, Salvador; Rivers, David A.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：We study the nonparametric identification of gross output production functions under the environment of the commonly employed proxy variable methods. We show that applying these methods to gross output requires additional sources of variation in the demand for flexible inputs (e.g., prices). Using a transformation of the firm's first-order condition, we develop a new nonparametric identification strategy for gross output that can be employed even when additional sources of variation are not av...
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作者：Goldin, Jacob; Reck, Daniel
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：In many settings, decision makers' behavior is observed to vary on the basis of seemingly arbitrary factors. Such framing effects cast doubt on the welfare conclusions drawn from revealed-preference analysis. We relax the assumptions underlying that approach to accommodate settings in which framing effects are present. Plausible restrictions of varying strength permit either partial or point identification of preferences for the decision makers who choose consistently across frames. Recovering...
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作者：Ely, Jeffrey C.; Szydlowski, Martin
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We study information as an incentive device in a dynamic moral hazard framework. An agent works on a task of uncertain difficulty, modeled as the duration of required effort. The principal knows the task difficulty and provides information over time. The optimal mechanism features moving goalposts: an initial disclosure makes the agent sufficiently optimistic that the task is easy. If the task is indeed difficult, the agent is told this only after working long enough to put the difficult task ...
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作者：Baliga, Sandeep; Sjostrom, Tomas
作者单位：Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：Using a simple bargaining game, we investigate how strategic interactions are shaped by preferences, technology, and endowments. We study whether changes in relative military capabilities make conflicts more likely and find a nonmonotonic relationship between the cost of conflict and the probability of conflict. The game has strategic complements if the cost of conflict is small and there is a large first-mover advantage and has strategic substitutes otherwise. This characterization generates ...
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作者：Jacobsen, Mark R.; Knittel, Christopher R.; Sallee, James M.; van Benthem, Arthur A.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Corrective taxes can solve many market failures, but actual policies frequently deviate from the theoretical ideal because of administrative or political constraints. We present a method to quantify the efficiency costs of constraints on externality-correcting policies or, more generally, the costs of imperfect pricing, using simple regression statistics. Under certain conditions, the R-2 and the sum of squared residuals from a regression of true externalities on policy variables measure relat...
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作者：Pomatto, Luciano; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Yale University
摘要：Stochastic dominance is a crucial tool for the analysis of choice under risk. It is typically analyzed as a property of two gambles that are taken in isolation. We study how additional independent sources of risk (e.g., uninsurable labor risk, house price risk) can affect the ordering of gambles. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, background risk can be strong enough to render lotteries that are ranked by their expectation ranked in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. We extend our res...
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作者：Noe, Thomas
作者单位：University of Oxford; Bank of Finland
摘要：Consider a decision maker who selects between paired random draws from two unconditional distributions, always selecting the larger draw in the pair. When will the resulting selection-conditioned distributions be ordered by first-order stochastic or monotone likelihood ratio dominance? In various guises, this question arises in many economic contexts-tournaments, contests, auctions, cheap-talk games, announcement returns, qualitative choice models, and treatment effects under self-selection. T...
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作者：Fryer, Roland G., Jr.
作者单位：Harvard University
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作者：Orlov, Dmitry; Skrzypacz, Andrzej; Zryumov, Pavel
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Stanford University; University of Rochester
摘要：A principal decides when to exercise a real option. A biased agent influences this decision by strategically disclosing information. Committing to disclose all information with a delay is the optimal way to persuade the principal to wait. Without dynamic commitment, this promise is credible only if the agent's bias is small; otherwise, he pipets information, probabilistically delaying the principal's action. When the agent is biased toward early exercise, his lack of commitment to remain quiet...
