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作者：Chen, Yan; Kesten, Onur
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; University of Sydney
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作者：Foley-Fisher, Nathan; Narajabad, Borghan; Verani, Stephane
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：The interaction of worsening fundamentals and strategic complementarities among investors renders identification of self-fulfilling runs challenging. We propose a dynamic model to show how exogenous variation in firms' liability structures can be exploited to obtain variation in the strength of strategic complementarities. Applying this identification strategy to puttable securities offered by US life insurers, we find that at least 40% of the $18 billion run on life insurers by institutional ...
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作者：Gosnell, Greer K.; List, John A.; Metcalfe, Robert D.
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Chicago; Australian National University; Boston University
摘要：Increasing evidence indicates the importance of management in determining firms' productivity. Yet causal evidence regarding the effectiveness of management practices is scarce, especially for skilled labor in the developed world. In a field experiment measuring commercial airline captains' productivity, we test four distinct management practices: performance monitoring, performance feedback, target setting, and prosocial incentives. These practices-particularly monitoring and target setting-s...
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作者：Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We analyze a bilateral trade model where the buyer chooses the distribution of her valuation for the good. The seller, after observing the buyer's distribution but not the realized valuation, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If distributions are costless, the price and the payoffs of both the buyer and the seller are shown to be 1/e in the unique equilibrium outcome. The buyer's equilibrium distribution generates a unit-elastic demand, and trade is ex post efficient. These properties are sho...
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作者：Fisman, Raymond; Sarkar, Arkodipta; Skrastins, Janis; Vig, Vikrant
作者单位：Boston University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Washington University (WUSTL); University of London; London Business School
摘要：We provide microeconomic evidence on ethnic frictions and market efficiency, using dyadic data on managers and borrowers from a large Indian bank. We conjecture that, if exposure to religion-based communal violence intensifies intergroup animosity, riot exposure will lead to lending decisions that are more sensitive to a borrower's religion. We find that riot-exposed Hindu branch managers lend relatively less to Muslim borrowers and that these loans are less likely to default, consistent with ...
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作者：Mourifie, Ismael; Henry, Marc; Meango, Romuald
作者单位：University of Toronto; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Max Planck Society
摘要：We analyze the empirical content of the Roy model, stripped down to sector-specific unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection on the basis of potential outcomes. We characterize sharp bounds on the joint distribution of potential outcomes and testable implications of the Roy model. We apply these bounds to derive a measure of departure from Roy self-selection, so as to identify prime targets for intervention. Special emphasis is put on the case of binary outcomes. We analyze a Roy model of c...
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作者：Grennan, Matthew; Swanson, Ashley
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要：Using data on hospitals' purchases across a large number of important product categories, we find that access to information on purchasing by peer hospitals leads to reductions in the prices hospitals negotiate for supplies. These effects are concentrated among hospitals previously paying relatively high prices for brands purchased in large volumes. Evidence from coronary stents suggests that transparency allows hospitals to resolve asymmetric information problems, but savings are limited in p...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Harstad, Bard
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Oslo
摘要：In recent decades, democratic countries have negotiated hundreds of international treaties and agreements. This paper analyzes the equilibrium design of treaties negotiated by political incumbents seeking reelection. We show that incumbents are prone to negotiate treaties that are weak, in that they may or may not be complied with: this makes it possible to differentiate the alternative candidates in a way that favors the incumbent. We also show that political economy considerations lead to ov...
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作者：Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Deng, Alex; Montiel Olea, Jose Luis; Rao, Justin; Weyl, E. Glen
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Microsoft; Columbia University; Microsoft; Princeton University
摘要：We propose a new framework for optimal experimentation, which we term the A/B testing problem. Our model departs from the existing literature by allowing for fat tails. Our key insight is that the optimal strategy depends on whether most gains accrue from typical innovations or from rare, unpredictable large successes. If the tails of the unobserved distribution of innovation quality are not too fat, the standard approach of using a few high-powered big experiments is optimal. However, if the ...
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作者：Somaini, Paulo
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper provides a nonparametric identification result for procurement models with asymmetric bidders, dependent private information, and interdependent costs. For risk-neutral bidders, the model's payoff-relevant primitives are the joint distribution of private information and each bidder's full-information expected cost. The joint distribution of bids identifies the joint distribution of signals. First-order conditions identify the expected cost conditional on tying with at least one comp...
