The Strategy and Technology of Conflict

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Baliga, Sandeep; Sjostrom, Tomas
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-3808
• DOI: 10.1086/707767
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3186-3219
• 关键词: equilibrium

摘要

Using a simple bargaining game, we investigate how strategic interactions are shaped by preferences, technology, and endowments. We study whether changes in relative military capabilities make conflicts more likely and find a nonmonotonic relationship between the cost of conflict and the probability of conflict. The game has strategic complements if the cost of conflict is small and there is a large first-mover advantage and has strategic substitutes otherwise. This characterization generates predictions regarding the use of strategic investments-for example, in defense systems. An extension of the model shows how expanding one's territory today may increase the risk of conflict tomorrow.