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作者：Bardhan, Pranab; Mookherjee, Dilip; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University; Keio University
摘要：We study a competitive theory of middlemen with brand-name reputations necessary to overcome product quality moral hazard problems. Agents with heterogeneous abilities sort into different sectors and occupations. Middleman margins do not equalize across sectors if production of different goods are differentially prone to moral hazard, generating endogenous mobility barriers. We embed the model in a setting of North-South trade, and explore the distributive implications of trade liberalization....
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, Atila; Bagwell, Kyle
作者单位：Duke University; Stanford University
摘要：We study trust, reciprocity, and favors in a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the future. The size of a favor owed may decline over time, following neutral periods. Indeed, a favor-exchange relationship with this feature improves on a simple favor-exchange relationship. In some settings,...
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作者：Conlon, Christopher T.; Mortimer, Julie Holland
作者单位：Columbia University; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Incomplete product availability is an important feature of many markets, and ignoring changes in availability may bias demand estimates. We study a new dataset from a wireless inventory system on vending machines to track product availability every four hours. The data allow us to account for product availability when estimating demand, and provide valuable variation for identifying substitution patterns when products stock out. We develop a procedure that allows for changes in product availab...
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作者：De Loecker, Jan
作者单位：Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Learning by exporting refers to the mechanism whereby a firm's performance improves after entering export markets. This mechanism is often mentioned in policy documents, but many econometric studies have not found corroborating evidence. I show that the econometric methods rely on an assumption that productivity evolves exogenously. I show how to accommodate endogenous productivity processes, such as learning by exporting. I discuss the bias introduced by ignoring such a process, and show that...
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作者：Coles, Peter; Kushnir, Alexey; Niederle, Muriel
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Zurich; Stanford University
摘要：Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and ...
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作者：Mialon, Hugo M.; Mialon, Sue H.
作者单位：Emory University
摘要：We develop a model of figurative or indirect speech, which may convey a meaning that differs from its literal meaning. The model yields analytical conditions for speech to be figurative in equilibrium and delivers a number of comparative statics results. For instance, it predicts that the likelihood of figurative speech is greater if the benefit to the listener of correctly understanding the speaker is greater. We then apply the model to analyze particular forms of indirect speech, including t...
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作者：Armantier, Olivier; Holt, Charles A.; Plott, Charles R.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Virginia; California Institute of Technology
摘要：The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove toxic assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would be normalized by reference prices that reflect relative value estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, even with inaccurate reference price...
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作者：Saggi, Kamal; Woodland, Alan; Yildiz, Halis Murat
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; University of New South Wales Sydney; Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper compares equilibrium outcomes of two games of trade liberalization. In the Bilateralism game, countries choose whether to liberalize trade preferentially via a customs union (CU), multilaterally, or not at all. The Multilateralism game is a restricted version of the Bilateralism game in that countries cannot form CUs and can only undertake non-discriminatory trade liberalization. When countries have symmetric endowments, global free trade is the only stable equilibrium of both games...
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作者：Jaffe, Sonia; Weyl, E. Glen
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：Using information local to the premerger equilibrium, we derive approximations of the expected changes in prices and welfare generated by a merger. We extend the pricing pressure approach of recent work to allow for non-Bertrand conduct, adjusting the diversion ratio and incorporating the change in anticipated accommodation. To convert pricing pressures into quantitative estimates of price changes, we multiply them by the merger pass-through matrix, which (under conditions we specify) is appro...
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作者：Banerjee, Abhijit; Duflo, Esther; Ghatak, Maitreesh; Lafortune, Jeanne
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：This paper analyzes how preferences for a noneconomic characteristic (e.g., caste) can affect equilibrium patterns of matching, and empirically evaluates this in the context of middle-class Indian arranged marriages. We show theoretically how the equilibrium consequences of caste depend on whether preferences are towards one's own group or for marrying up. We then estimate actual preferences for caste and other attributes using a unique dataset of individuals who placed matrimonial advertiseme...
