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作者：Fuchs, William; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We study dynamic bargaining with private information and a deadline. As commitment power disappears, there is a clear deadline effect. That is, trade takes place smoothly before the deadline and with an atom right at the deadline. Prices, timing of trade, and the deadline effect respond to the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Bleaker disagreement options lead to more trade and proportionally more of the agreements taking place on the verge of the deadline. Time to deadline can affect...
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作者：Fleurbaey, Marc; Schokkaert, Erik
作者单位：Princeton University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：Behavioral economics has shaken the view that individuals have well-defined, consistent, and stable preferences. This raises a challenge for welfare economics, which takes as a key postulate that individual preferences should be respected. We argue, in agreement with Bernheim (2009) and Bernheim and Rangel (2009), that behavioral economics is compatible with consistency of partial preferences, and explore how the Bernheim-Rangel approach can be extended to deal with distributive issues. We rev...
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作者：Gayle, Philip G.
作者单位：Kansas State University
摘要：Previous research has suggested that codeshare agreements eliminate double marginalization that exists when unaffiliated airlines independently determine the price for different segments of an interline trip. Using a structural econometric model, this paper investigates whether codeshare contracts do eliminate double marginalization. The results suggest that both upstream and downstream margins persist when the operating carrier of a codeshare product also offers competing single-carrier produ...
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作者：Baccara, Mariagiovanna; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); California Institute of Technology
摘要：The focus of this paper is the endogenous formation of peer groups. In our model, agents choose peers before making contributions to public projects, and they differ in how much they value one project relative to another. Thus, the group's preference composition affects the type of contributions made. We characterize stable groups and find that they must be sufficiently homogeneous. We also provide conditions for some heterogeneity to persist as the group size grows large. In an application in...
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作者：Bernard, Andrew B.; Redding, Stephen J.; Schott, Peter K.
作者单位：Dartmouth College; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Yale University
摘要：We develop a method for identifying departures from relative factor price equality that is robust to unobserved variation in factor productivity. We implement this method using data on the relative wage bills of nonproduction and production workers across 170 local labor markets comprising the continental United States for 1972, 1992, and 2007. We find evidence of statistically significant differences in relative wages in all three years. These differences increase in magnitude over time and a...
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作者：Fox, Jeremy T.; Bajari, Patrick
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
摘要：We propose a method to structurally estimate the deterministic component of bidder valuations in FCC spectrum auctions, and apply it to the 1995-1996 C block auction. We base estimation on a pairwise stability condition: two bidders cannot exchange two licenses in a way that increases the sum of their valuations. Pairwise stability holds in some theoretical models of simultaneous ascending auctions under intimidatory collusion and demand reduction. Pairwise stability results in a matching game...
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作者：Bedre-Defolie, Oezlem; Calvano, Emilio
作者单位：European School of Management & Technology; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial interchange fees to cardholders' banks on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, oversubsidizing card usage and overtaxing merchants. We show that this distortion is systematic and arises from the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage), whereas merchants make only one (membership). In general, we contr...
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作者：Galeotti, Andrea; Rogers, Brian W.
作者单位：University of Essex; Northwestern University
摘要：We consider the spread of a harmful state through a population divided into two groups. Interaction patterns capture the full spectrum of assortativity possibilities. We show that a central planner who aims for eradication optimally either divides equally the resources across groups, or concentrates entirely on one group, depending on whether there is positive or negative assortativity, respectively. We study a game in which agents can, at a cost, immunize. Negative assortative interactions ge...
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作者：Athey, Susan; Coey, Dominic; Levin, Jonathan
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University
摘要：Set-asides and subsidies are used extensively in government procurement and resource sales. We analyze these policies in an empirical model of US Forest Service timber auctions. The model fits the data well both within the sample of unrestricted sales used for estimation, and when we predict (out-of-sample) outcomes for small business set-asides. Our estimates suggest that restricting entry substantially reduces efficiency and revenue, although it increases small business participation. An alt...
