-
作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Quite often, decision makers face choices that involve new aspects and alternatives never considered before. Scenarios of this sort may arise, for instance, as a result of technological progress or from individual circumstances such as growing awareness. In such situations, simple inference rules, past experience, and knowledge about historic choice problems may prove helpful in determining what would be a reasonable action to take vis-a-vis a new problem. In the context of decision making und...
-
作者：Christiansen, Nels; Georganas, Sotiris; Kagel, John H.
作者单位：Trinity University; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including strange bedfellow coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outcome not predicted by the theory but a staple of the applied political economy literature. Coalition form...
-
作者：Ortalo-Magne, Francois; Prat, Andrea
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：We study the equilibrium properties of an overlapping-generation economy where agents choose where to locate and how much housing to own, and city residents vote on the number of new building permits every period. Undersupply of housing persists in equilibrium under conditions we characterize. City residents invest in housing because they expect their investment to be protected by a majority opposed to urban growth. They vote against growth because they have invested in local housing. This vic...
-
作者：Banerji, A.; Gupta, Neha
作者单位：University of Delhi; Delhi School of Economics
摘要：We provide a novel experimental auction design, in which (i) an exogenous decrease in the probability of winning, conditional on the bid, reduces the optimal bid of a loss averse agent whose reference point is expectations based; (ii) observed bid distributions uniquely identify the participants' latent value distribution and loss-aversion parameter. Experimental evidence affirms the presence of such reference points. We show that at the estimated magnitudes of loss aversion, (a) conventional ...
-
作者：Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Experimental evidence suggests that people tend to be overconfident in the sense that they overestimate the accuracy of their private information. In this paper, we show that risk-averse principals might prefer overconfident agents in various strategic interactions because these agents help diversify the aggregate risk. This may help understanding why successful analysts and entrepreneurs tend to be overconfident. In addition, a different interpretation of the model presents a novel evolutiona...
-
作者：Bierbrauer, Felix J.
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：We study optimal income taxation and public-goods provision under the assumption that the cross-section distributions of productive abilities or public-goods preferences are not known a priori. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. The analysis therefore incorporates a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main result is that increased public-goods provision is associated with a more distortionary...
-
作者：Kurino, Morimitsu
摘要：Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, each year college freshmen move in and seniors move out of on-campus housing. Each student stays on campus for only a few years. A student is a newcomer in the beginning and then becomes an existing tenant. Motivated by this observation, we introduce a model of house allocation with overlapping generations. In terms of a dynamic rule without monetary transfers, we examine two static rules of serial dictatorship ...
-
作者：Belhaj, Mohamed; Bourles, Renaud; Deroian, Frederic
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact ...
-
作者：Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：When data is scarce, it is difficult to screen the opinions of informed and uninformed experts. In spite of this difficulty it is possible to deliver incentives for informed experts to honestly reveal their views, and for uninformed experts to do no harm to a principal in the sense that uninformed experts report the view the principal held originally (i.e., without the expert's report). This follows even if there is only a single data point to evaluate the expert's opinions and the expert's pr...
-
作者：Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco
作者单位：Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Bologna
摘要：What institutions can sustain cooperation in groups of strangers? Here we study the role of monetary systems. In an experiment, subjects sometimes needed help and sometimes could incur a cost to help an anonymous counterpart. In the absence of money, the intertemporal exchange of help, which could be supported by a norm of community punishment of defectors, did not emerge. Introducing intrinsically worthless tokens substantially altered patterns of behavior. Monetary trade emerged, which incre...
