The Coordination Value of Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Camera, Gabriele; Casari, Marco
• 署名单位: Chapman University System; Chapman University; University of Bologna
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.290
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 290-314
• 关键词: gender-differences; repeated play; social norms; Fiat money; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; equilibrium; INFORMATION; strategies; MARKETS

摘要

What institutions can sustain cooperation in groups of strangers? Here we study the role of monetary systems. In an experiment, subjects sometimes needed help and sometimes could incur a cost to help an anonymous counterpart. In the absence of money, the intertemporal exchange of help, which could be supported by a norm of community punishment of defectors, did not emerge. Introducing intrinsically worthless tokens substantially altered patterns of behavior. Monetary trade emerged, which increased predictability of play and promoted cooperation when strangers could trade help for a token.