Coalition Formation in a Legislative Voting Game

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Christiansen, Nels; Georganas, Sotiris; Kagel, John H.
• 署名单位: Trinity University; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.182
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 182-204
• 关键词: goods; POWER

摘要

We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including strange bedfellow coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outcome not predicted by the theory but a staple of the applied political economy literature. Coalition formation is better characterized by an efficient equal split between coalition partners than the subgame perfect equilibrium prediction, which has implications for stable political party formation.