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作者：Kennes, John; Monte, Daniel; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
作者单位：Aarhus University
摘要：We study the problem of centralized allocation of children to public day care centers, illustrated by the case of Denmark. Our framework applies to problems of dynamic matching in which there is entry and exit of agents over time; for example, the school choice problem once student mobility is taken into account. We show that there does not exist any mechanism that is both stable and strategy-proof. We also show that the well-known Top Trading Cycles mechanism is neither Pareto efficient nor s...
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作者：Owens, David; Grossman, Zachary; Fackler, Ryan
作者单位：Haverford College; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We document individuals' willingness to pay to control their own payoff. Experiment participants choose whether to bet on themselves or on a partner answering a quiz question correctly. Given participants' beliefs, which we elicit separately, expected-money maximizers would bet on themselves in 56.4 percent of the decisions. However, participants actually bet on themselves in 64.9 percent of their opportunities, reflecting an aggregate control premium. The average participant is willing to sac...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Teper, Roee
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; INSEAD Business School; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：Quite often, decision makers face choices that involve new aspects and alternatives never considered before. Scenarios of this sort may arise, for instance, as a result of technological progress or from individual circumstances such as growing awareness. In such situations, simple inference rules, past experience, and knowledge about historic choice problems may prove helpful in determining what would be a reasonable action to take vis-a-vis a new problem. In the context of decision making und...
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作者：Jeziorski, Przemyslaw
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：This study examines mergers in two-sided markets using a structural supply-and-demand model that employs data from the 1996-2006 merger wave in the US radio industry. In particular, it identifies the conflicting incentives for merged firms to exercise market power on both listener and advertiser sides of the market, and disaggregates the effects of mergers into changes in product variety and advertising quantity. Specifically, it finds 0.2 percent listener welfare increase (+0.3 percent from i...
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作者：Miller, David A.; Rozen, Kareen
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Yale University; Yale University
摘要：We study optimal contracting in team settings where agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts. Incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with underperformance, forgiving sanctioning schemes, and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally take on ...
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作者：Christiansen, Nels; Georganas, Sotiris; Kagel, John H.
作者单位：Trinity University; University of London; Royal Holloway University London; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We experimentally investigate the Jackson and Moselle (2002) model where legislators bargain over policy proposals and the allocation of private goods. Key comparative static predictions of the model hold with the introduction of private goods, including strange bedfellow coalitions. Private goods help to secure legislative compromise and increase the likelihood of proposals passing, an outcome not predicted by the theory but a staple of the applied political economy literature. Coalition form...
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作者：Cooper, David J.; Kuehn, Kai-Uwe
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of East Anglia; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We study the effect of communication in an experimental game where cooperation is consistent with equilibrium play if players share an understanding that cheating will be punished. Consistent with communication acting as a coordinating device, credible preplay threats to punish cheating are the most effective message to facilitate collusion. Promises to collude also improve cooperation. Credible threats do not occur in a treatment with a limited message space that permits threats of punishment...
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作者：Dana, James D., Jr.; Orlov, Eugene
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：Airline capacity utilization increased dramatically between 1993 and 2007, after staying fairly level following deregulation in 1978. We argue that consumers' use of the Internet to investigate and purchase airline tickets reduces market frictions and allows airlines to meet demand with less capacity and higher load factors. We find that differences in the rate of change of metropolitan-area Internet penetration are positively correlated with differences in the rate of change of airlines' airp...
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作者：Hopkins, Ed
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：One explanation of altruism is that it arises from mentalizing,'' the process of understanding the mental states of others. Another is based on sexual selection: altruism is a costly signal of good genes. This paper shows that these two arguments are stronger together in that altruists who can mentalize have a greater advantage over when they can signal their type, even though these signals are costly, when such signaling allows better matching opportunities. Finally, it shows how mentalizing ...
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Lee, Frances Zhiyun Xu
作者单位：University of Iowa; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We consider a war of attrition where the players can learn about a state that determines their payoffs at stochastic deadline. We study how the incentives to acquire information depend on the (un)verifiability of information and its implications for efficiency. Unverifiability creates distortions (strategic delay in concession or duplication in information acquisition), but encourages information acquisition. In our model, provided that the information acquisition cost is small, these two effe...
