Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy with Aggregate Uncertainty

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bierbrauer, Felix J.
• 署名单位: University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.6.1.205
• 发表日期: 2014
• 页码: 205-257
• 关键词: Optimal income taxation; robust mechanism design; Public Good Provision; large numbers; incentive compatibility; large economies; self-selection; GOODS; collusion; LAW

摘要

We study optimal income taxation and public-goods provision under the assumption that the cross-section distributions of productive abilities or public-goods preferences are not known a priori. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. The analysis therefore incorporates a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main result is that increased public-goods provision is associated with a more distortionary and a more redistributive tax system. With a conventional Mirrleesian treatment, the level of public-goods provision is not related to how distortionary or redistributive the tax system is.