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作者：Piveteau, Paul
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University
摘要：This paper develops a dynamic structural model of trade in which firms slowly accumulate consumers in foreign markets. Estimating the model using export data from individual firms and a particle Markov chain Monte Carlo estimator, the model predicts lower survival rates for new exporters and estimates low entry costs of exporting-less than half of those estimated in the absence of consumer accumulation. Using simulations and out-of-sample predictions, I show that the introduction of such frict...
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作者：Jovanovic, Boyan
作者单位：New York University
摘要：Product recall data and information on stock price reactions to recalls are used to estimate the value of reputation in a model in which product quality is not contractible. A recall is the result of a product defect that signals low effort. The recall triggers a reduction in the firm's product price and value, which then both rise steadily until its next defect occurs. We estimate that reputation accounts for 8.3 percent of firm value and that welfare is 26 percent of its first best level. A ...
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作者：Barkley, Aaron
作者单位：University of Melbourne
摘要：This paper investigates the how government outsourcing affects efficiency and expenditures by considering how outsourcing decisions are determined along two dimensions: (i) cost differences between private firms and government suppliers of public goods and (ii) dynamics arising from cost complementarities and capacity constraints. I formulate and estimate a dynamic model of government outsourcing using project-level data from the dredging industry. Model estimates indicate substantial cost sav...
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作者：Kawai, K. E., I; Toyama, Yuta; Watanabe, Yasutora
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Waseda University; University of Tokyo
摘要：We study how voter turnout affects the aggregation of preferences in elections. Under voluntary voting, election outcomes disproportionately aggregate the preferences of voters with low voting cost and high preference intensity. We show identification of the correlation structure among preferences, costs, and perceptions of voting efficacy, and explore how the correlation affects preference aggregation. Using 2004 US presidential election data, we find that young, low-income, less-educated, an...
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作者：Thomas, Caroline D.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This paper considers a two-player game of strategic experimentation with competition. Each agent faces a two-armed bandit problem where she continually chooses between her private, risky arm and a common, safe arm. Each agent has exclusive access to her private arm. However, the common arm can only be activated by one agent at a time. This congestion creates negative payoff externalities. Our main finding is that congestion gives rise to new strategic considerations: players perceive a strateg...
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作者：Angrisani, Marco; Guarino, Antonio; Jehiel, Philippe; Kitagawa, Toru
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting in sequence, state their beliefs about the value of a good after observing their predecessors' statements and a private signal. We compare the behavior in the laboratory with the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction and the predictions of bounded rationality models of decision-making: the redundancy of information neglect model and the overconfidence model. The results of our experiment are in line with the p...
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作者：Billot, Antoine; Qu, Xiangyu
作者单位：Universite Paris-Pantheon-Assas; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Wuhan University of Technology
摘要：The utilitarian aggregation rule requires social utility and beliefs to be a convex combination of individual utilities and beliefs, respectively. Since, in the case of belief heterogeneity, the standard Pareto condition is incompatible with such a separate aggregation, a new condition, called the belief-proof Pareto condition, is proposed to alleviate occurrences of spurious agreement by restricting unanimity to beliefs that can be considered reasonable by society. Then, we show, in the Ansco...
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作者：Jin, Ginger Zhe; Luca, Michael; Martin, Daniel
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver ac...
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作者：Araujo, Felipe A.; Wang, Stephanie W.; Wilson, Alistair J.
作者单位：Lehigh University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We examine a common value dynamic matching environment where adverse selection accrues slowly over time. Theoretical best responses are therefore time varying, and the prior experimental literature suggests that sequential environments might lead to greater understanding of adverse selection in this dynamic setting. However, while a sophisticated minority in our experiment do condition on time and are close to a best response, the majority use a stationary response, even after extended experie...
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作者：Engl, Florian; Riedl, Arno; Weber, Roberto
作者单位：University of Cologne; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Tilburg University; Maastricht University; University of Zurich
摘要：Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about...
