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作者：Ngangoue, M. Kathleen; Weizsaecker, Georg
作者单位：New York University; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：Our experiments investigate the extent to which traders learn from the price, differentiating between situations where orders are submitted before versus after the price has realized. In simultaneous markets with bids that are conditional on the price, traders neglect the information conveyed by the hypothetical value of the price. In sequential markets where the price is known prior to the bid submission, traders react to price to an extent that is roughly consistent with the benchmark theory...
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作者：Schummer, James; Velez, Rodrigo A.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even wizen the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others' preferences. We pr...
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作者：Lu, Jingfeng; Ye, Lixin; Feng, X. I. N.
作者单位：National University of Singapore; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; Nanjing University
摘要：We study how to orchestrate information acquisition in an environment where bidders endowed with original estimates (types ) about their private values can acquire further information by incurring a cost. We consider both single-round and fully sequential shortlisting rules. The optimal single-round shortlisting rule admits the set of most efficient bidders that maximizes expected virtual surplus adjusted by the second-stage signal and information acquisition cost. When shortlisting is fully s...
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作者：Halonen-Akatwijuka, Maija; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：University of Bristol
摘要：We examine a setup where two agents allocate a fixed budget between public goods in two areas. The agents may be biased to one area, which is their private information. Without communication, the funds are allocated inefficiently, resulting in gaps and duplication in public good provision. Direct communication between the agents is ineffective and cannot resolve the coordination failure even when the potential biases are negligible. Coordination can be improved by a mediator who filters the in...
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作者：Tyson, Christopher J.
作者单位：University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We propose the exponential satisficing model of boundedly rational decision-making, a general-purpose tool designed for use in typical microeconomic applications. The model posits that the preferences perceived and acted upon by the agent are a stochastic coarsening of his or her true, welfare-significant preferences. The decision-maker's perceptual capabilities are controlled by a preference resolution parameter, which smoothly varies the impact of cognitive constraints on choice. To demonstr...
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作者：Millner, Antony; Heyen, Daniel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：Commentators often lament forecasters' inability to provide precise predictions of the long-run behavior of complex economic and physical systems. Yet their concerns often conflate the presence of substantial long-run uncertainty with the need for long-run predictability; short-run predictions can partially substitute for long-run predictions if decision-makers can adjust their activities over time. So what is the relative importance of short- and long-run predictability? We study this questio...
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作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：A principal seeks to persuade an agent to accept an offer of uncertain value before a deadline expires. The principal can generate information, but exerts no control over exogenous outside information. The combined effect of the deadline and outside information creates incentives for the principal to keep uncertainty high in the first periods so as to persuade the agent close to the deadline. We characterize the equilibrium, compare it to the single-player decision problem in which exogenous o...
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作者：Shelegia, Sandro; Wilson, Chris M.
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; Loughborough University
摘要：To better understand temporary price reductions or sales, this paper presents a generalized clearinghouse framework of advertised sales and explores some applications. By viewing the firms as competing in utility and amending the conventional tiebreak rule, we allow for multiple dimensions of firm heterogeneity in complex market environments. Moreover, we (i) provide original insights into the number and types of firms that use sales, (ii) offer new results on how firm heterogeneity affects ma...
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作者：Dessein, Wouter; Santos, Tano
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Is firm behavior mainly driven by its environment or rather by the characteristics of its managers? We develop a cognitive theory of manager fixed effects, where the allocation of managerial attention determines firm behavior. We show that in complex environments, the endogenous allocation of attention exacerbates manager fixed effects. Small differences in managerial expertise then may result in dramatically different firm behavior, as managers devote scarce attention in a way that amplifies ...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Siegenthaler, Simon
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：In markets with asymmetric information, where equilibria are often inefficient, bargaining can help promote welfare. We design an experiment to examine the impact of competition and price transparency in such settings. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that competition promotes efficiency if bargainers cannot observe each other's price offers. Contrary to the predictions, however, the efficiency-enhancing effect of competition persists even when offers are observable. We exp...
