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作者：Allen, Jason; Hortacsu, Ali; Kastl, Jakub
作者单位：Bank of Canada; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University
摘要：Using detailed information from the Canadian interbank payments system and liquidity-providing facilities, we find that despite sustained increases in market-rate spreads, the increase in banks' willingness to pay for liquidity during the 2008-2009 financial crisis was short-lived. Our study suggests that high-frequency distress indicators based on demand for liquidity offered by central banks can be complementary, and perhaps even superior, to market-based indicators, especially during times ...
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作者：Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study the optimal intervention policy to stop projects in a relational contract between a principal and a policymaker. The policymaker is privately informed about his ability and privately chooses how much effort to exert. Before a project is completed, the principal receives a signal about its outcome and can intervene to stop it. Intervention may prevent a bad outcome, but no intervention leads to better learning about the policymaker's ability. In the benchmarks with observable effort or...
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作者：Mace, Antonin; Treibich, Rafael
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); University of Southern Denmark
摘要：We study the design of voting rules for committees representing heterogeneous groups (countries, states, districts) when cooperation among groups is voluntary. While efficiency recommends weighting groups proportionally to their stakes, we show that accounting for participation constraints entails overweighting some groups, those for which the incentive to cooperate is the lowest. When collective decisions are not enforceable, cooperation induces more stringent constraints that may require gra...
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作者：Cox, Caleb A.; Stoddard, Brock
作者单位：Virginia Commonwealth University; University of North Carolina; Appalachian State University
摘要：We experimentally examine private information and communication in a public goods environment with uncertain returns. We consider a common-value public goods game in which the return to contribution is either high or low. Before contributing, three players observe private signals correlated with the return and send cheap talk messages to one another. There are social gains from truthfulness, but a private incentive to exaggerate. We compare treatments with and without cheap talk, finding that ...
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作者：Freeman, David J.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University
摘要：This paper proposes a novel way of distinguishing whether a person is naive or sophisticated about her own dynamic inconsistency using only her task-completion behavior. It shows that adding an unused extra opportunity to complete a task can lead a naive (but not a sophisticated) person to complete it later and can lead a sophisticated (but not a naive) person to complete the task earlier. These results provide a framework for revealing preference and sophistication types from behavior in a ge...
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作者：Andersson, Tommy; Cseh, Agnes; Ehlers, Lars; Erlanson, Albin
作者单位：Lund University; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; University of Potsdam; Universite de Montreal; University of Essex
摘要：This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., unbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and tho...
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作者：Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A principal owns a firm, hires an agent of uncertain productivity, and designs a dynamic policy for evaluating his performance. The agent observes ongoing evaluations and decides when to quit. When not quitting, the agent is paid a wage that is linear in his expected productivity; the principal claims the residual performance. After quitting, the players secure fixed outside options. I show that equilibrium is Pareto efficient. For a broad class of performance technologies, the equilibrium wag...
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作者：Choi, Jay Pil; Jeon, Doh-Shin
作者单位：Michigan State University; Yonsei University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Motivated by recent antitrust cases in markets with zero-pricing, we develop a leverage theory of tying in two-sided markets. In the presence of the nonnegative price constraint, the Chicago school critique of tie-ins fails to hold. In the independent products case, tying provides a mechanism to circumvent the constraint in the tied market without inviting aggressive responses by the rival firm. In the complementary products case, the price squeeze mechanism cannot be used to extract surplus f...
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作者：Fershtman, Chaim; Persitz, Dotan
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：We present a strategic network formation model based on membership in clubs. Individuals choose affiliations. The set of all memberships induces a weighted network where two individuals are directly connected if they share a club. Two individuals may also be indirectly connected using multiple memberships of third parties. Individuals gain from their position in the induced network and pay membership fees. We study the club congestion model where the weight of a link decreases with the size of...
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作者：Monnet, Cyril; Quintin, Erwan
作者单位：University of Bern; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study efficient exclusion policies in a canonical credit model that features both exogenous and strategic default along the equilibrium path. Policies that maximize welfare in a stationary equilibrium implement exclusion for a finite and deterministic number of periods following default. Front-loading exclusion makes the mass of socially valuable transactions as high as it can be in steady state. Less intuitively, doing so also maximizes the average welfare of excluded agents in equilibrium...
