Showing Off or Laying Low? The Economics of Psych-outst

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Denter, Philipp; Morgan, John; Sisak, Dana
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190234
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 529-580
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; INFORMATION; contests; incentives; signal; games; NORM

摘要

We analyze the incentives for showing off , which we model as a costly signaling game , and study the consequences of norms against such behavior. Prior to competing in a contest , a newcomer can signal his talent to an incumbent. In equilibrium , costly signaling of ability occurs only when the newcomer is exceptionally talented. In such situations signaling benefits both contestants: the newcomer for obvious reasons; the incumbent by economizing on wasted effort in the contest. Our results rationalize the emergence of norms against showing off in settings where total effort is important. When selection efficiency matters , such norms decrease welfare. (JEL D82, D83, D91, Z13)