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作者：Ide, Enrique; Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：An increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of must-have items: products that distributors must carry to compete effectively. Motivated by these cases, , we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one-stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit...
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作者：Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Yao, Xinlu
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game , , signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be significantly above those in a static , , complete information game , , even when the possible variation in the privately observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry and show that , , with...
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作者：Colo, Philippe
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：An expert, , who is only informed of the probability of possible states, , communicates with a decision-maker through cheap talk. The decision-maker considers different probability distributions over states as possible and is ambiguity averse. I show that all equilibria of the game are equivalent to partitional ones and that the most informative is interim dominant for the expert. Information transmission regarding probabilities that are bad news for the decision-maker is facilitated by ambigu...
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作者：Barron, Kai; Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This study explores selection neglect in an experimental investment game where individuals can learn from others' outcomes. . Experiment 1 examines aggregate-level equilibrium behavior. . We fiind strong evidence of selection neglect and corroborate several comparative static predictions of Jehiel's ( 2018 ) model, , showing that the severity of the bias is aggravated by the sophistication of other individuals and moderated when information is more correlated across individuals. . Experiment 2...
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作者：Boyer, Pierre C.; Roberson, Brian; Esslinger, Christoph
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：How do electoral incentives influence the choice to experiment with a policy reform that generates uncertain future benefits? To answer this question, , we examine a two-period model of redistributive politics with uncertain policy outcomes involving a mixture of private and public benefits. . In equilibrium, , we find that the intertemporal trade-off between current policy costs and future benefits creates an incentive for politicians to use public debt to smooth spending across periods. . Th...
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作者：Watkins, Eddie
摘要：Consumer recycling generates new intermediate inputs. If some of the inputs are used to manufacture a substitute for the original product, , the primary seller faces an incentive to reduce current output and raise rivals' future costs. I find that firms in the US paper industry facing exposure to future competition from the recycled sector, , based on differences between product specific recycling technologies, , reduced output more than firms not exposed to the recycled sector as consumer rec...
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作者：Halac, Marina; Kremer, Ilan; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Yale University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Warwick; Lancaster University
摘要：A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, , each delivering a signal of joint performance. We show that unlike under partial implementation, , the principal always exhausts her monitoring capacity to optimally implement work as a unique outcome. Optimal monitoring teams are homogeneous between them: equally sized and with agent...
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作者：Bridet, Luc; Schwardmann, Peter
作者单位：University of St Andrews; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We propose a model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers engage in self-deception to arrive at beliefs that optimally trade off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders' contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, , the borrower's motivated cognition increases her material welfare, , which explains why it is not driven out of markets. Second, , in line with empi...
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作者：Lambrecht, Marco; Proto, Eugenio; Rustichini, Aldo; Sofianos, Andis
作者单位：Hanken School of Economics; Universitetet i Stavanger; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Glasgow; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Durham University
摘要：How does information about players' intelligence affect strategic behavior? Game theory, , based on the assumption of common knowledge of rationality, , does not provide useful predictions. We experimentally show that, in the Prisoner's Dilemma, disclosure hampers cooperation: higher-intelligence players trust their partners less when playing against someone of lower ability. Similarly, , in the Battle of Sexes with low payoff inequality, , disclosure disrupts coordination, , as higher-intelli...
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作者：Benson, David; Blattner, Samuel; Grundl, Serafin; Kim, You suk; Onishi, Ken
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：Antitrust often uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ( HHI ) for merger screening and review. We argue that HHI-based antitrust policy using predefined markets in the banking industry misses anticompetitive effects that are predicted by the proximity of merging branch networks. Difference-in-differences estimates from thousands of mergers reveal that close-proximity bank acquisitions have harmful effects, , including branch closures, , even if they fall below the HHI threshold for enforcement. ...
