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作者：Toyama, Yuta
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：This paper develops and estimates a dynamic structural model of emissions abatement, , investment, , and permit trading with banking under cap-and-trade regulation. The model accounts for forward-looking behavior and transaction costs in the permit market, , which determine the temporal and geographical distribution of emissions in equilibrium and, , thus, , the welfare implications of the regulation. The model is applied to the US Acid Rain Program to evaluate the role of regulatory designs. ...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Magnani, Jacopo
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Norwegian University of Science & Technology (NTNU)
摘要：In vertically differentiated matching markets with private information, agents face an acceptance curse: being accepted as a partner conveys bad news. We experimentally investigate whether individuals anticipate the acceptance curse in such an environment. We test the effect of an exogenous change in reservation values, making some types more selective and inducing significant changes in the posterior distribution of match qualities. Consistent with limited strategic sophistication, subjects d...
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作者：Gill, David; Rosokha, Yaroslav
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：We aim to understand the role and evolution of beliefs in the indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma ( IRPD ) . To do so, , we elicit beliefs about the supergame strategies chosen by others. We find heterogeneity in beliefs and changes in beliefs with experience are central to understanding behavior and learning in the IRPD. Beliefs strongly predict cooperation, , beliefs respond to the return to cooperation, , most subjects choose strategies that perform well given their beliefs, , and beli...
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作者：Huet-Vaughn, Emiliano; McClure, Ethan M. L.; Serrato, Juan Carlos Suarez
作者单位：Claremont Colleges; Pomona College; University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：Individuals face nonlinear incentives in myriad situations. We test a fundamental assumption in such settings: that individuals display stable preferences when facing linear and nonlinear incentives. We use a laboratory experiment to characterize how revealed preferences are affected by changes in the budget set environment. Choices under kinked budgets exhibit the same very high levels of internally consistent behavior as they do under linear budgets. However, for about half the subjects, cho...
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作者：Rees-Jones, Alex; Shorrer, Ran; Tergiman, Chloe
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We present results from three experiments containing incentivized school choice scenarios. In these scenarios, , we vary whether schools' assessments of students are based on a common priority ( inducing correlation in admissions decisions) ) or are based on independent assessments ( eliminating correlation in admissions decisions). ) . The quality of students' application strategies declines in the presence of correlated admissions: application strategies become substantially more aggressive ...
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作者：Dvorak, Fabian; Fehrler, Sebastian
作者单位：University of Konstanz; University of Bremen
摘要：Case studies of cartels and recent theory suggest that communication is a key factor for cooperation under imperfect monitoring, , where actions can only be observed with noise. We conduct a laboratory experiment to study how communication affects cooperation under different monitoring structures. Pre-play communication reduces strategic uncertainty and facilitates very high cooperation rates at the beginning of an interaction. Under perfect monitoring, , this is sufficient to reach a high and...
