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作者：Novak, Vladimir; Matveenko, Andrei; Ravaioli, Silvio
作者单位：National Bank of Slovakia; University of Mannheim; Cornerstone Research
摘要：We show that rational but inattentive agents can become polarized ex ante. We present how optimal information acquisition and subsequent belief formation depend crucially on the agent-specific status quo valuation. Beliefs can systematically-in expectations over all possible signal realizations conditional on the state of the world- update away from the realized truth, and even agents with the same initial beliefs might become polarized. We design a laboratory experiment to test the model's pr...
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作者：Ide, Enrique; Montero, Juan-Pablo
作者单位：Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
摘要：An increasing number of monopolization cases have been constructed around the notion of must-have items: products that distributors must carry to compete effectively. Motivated by these cases, , we consider a multiproduct setting where upstream suppliers sell their products through competing distributors offering one-stop-shopping convenience to consumers. We show the emergence of products that distributors cannot afford not to carry if their rivals do. A supplier of such products can exploit...
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作者：Exley, Christine L.; Kessler, Judd B.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Distributional decisions regularly involve multiple payoff components. In a series of experiments , we show that individuals sometimes exhibit narrow equity concerns: applying fairness preferences narrowly on a specific component of payoffs rather than on broader payoff consequences. This behavior results in different distributional decisions depending on which payoff component we frame individuals to consider. We document narrow equity concerns in an exceedingly simple setting -in which payof...
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作者：DE Corniere, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Oxford
摘要：We study the profitability of bundling by an upstream firm that licenses technologies to downstream competitors and that faces competition for one of its technologies. In an otherwise standard Chicago -style model, the existence of downstream competition can make inefficient bundling profitable. Forcing downstream firms to use an inefficient technology reassures each one that it will face weak competition. This allows the upstream firm to extract more profit through its monopolized technology....
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作者：Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Yao, Xinlu
作者单位：Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; National Bureau of Economic Research; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We model repeated pricing by differentiated product firms when each firm has private information about its serially correlated marginal cost. In a fully separating equilibrium of the dynamic game , , signaling incentives can lead equilibrium prices to be significantly above those in a static , , complete information game , , even when the possible variation in the privately observed state variables is very limited. We calibrate our model using data from the beer industry and show that , , with...
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作者：Colo, Philippe
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：An expert, , who is only informed of the probability of possible states, , communicates with a decision-maker through cheap talk. The decision-maker considers different probability distributions over states as possible and is ambiguity averse. I show that all equilibria of the game are equivalent to partitional ones and that the most informative is interim dominant for the expert. Information transmission regarding probabilities that are bad news for the decision-maker is facilitated by ambigu...
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作者：Barron, Kai; Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe
作者单位：University of London; University College London; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要：This study explores selection neglect in an experimental investment game where individuals can learn from others' outcomes. . Experiment 1 examines aggregate-level equilibrium behavior. . We fiind strong evidence of selection neglect and corroborate several comparative static predictions of Jehiel's ( 2018 ) model, , showing that the severity of the bias is aggravated by the sophistication of other individuals and moderated when information is more correlated across individuals. . Experiment 2...
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作者：Boyer, Pierre C.; Roberson, Brian; Esslinger, Christoph
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：How do electoral incentives influence the choice to experiment with a policy reform that generates uncertain future benefits? To answer this question, , we examine a two-period model of redistributive politics with uncertain policy outcomes involving a mixture of private and public benefits. . In equilibrium, , we find that the intertemporal trade-off between current policy costs and future benefits creates an incentive for politicians to use public debt to smooth spending across periods. . Th...
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作者：Watkins, Eddie
摘要：Consumer recycling generates new intermediate inputs. If some of the inputs are used to manufacture a substitute for the original product, , the primary seller faces an incentive to reduce current output and raise rivals' future costs. I find that firms in the US paper industry facing exposure to future competition from the recycled sector, , based on differences between product specific recycling technologies, , reduced output more than firms not exposed to the recycled sector as consumer rec...
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作者：Chopra, Felix; Falk, Armin; Graeber, Thomas
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; University of Bonn; Harvard University
摘要：Most prosocial decisions involve intertemporal trade-offs. Yet , the timing of prosocial utility fiows is ambiguous and bypassed by most models of other-regarding preferences. We study the behavioral implications of the time structure of prosocial utility , leveraging a conceptual distinction between consequence-dated and choice-dated utility fiows. We conduct a high-stakes donation experiment that comprehensively characterizes discounting behavior in self-other tradeoffs and allows us to iden...
