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作者：Freund, Y; Schapire, RE
作者单位：AT&T
摘要：We present a simple algorithm for playing a repeated game. We show that a player using this algorithm suffers average loss that is guaranteed to come close to the minimum loss achievable by any fixed strategy. Our bounds are nonasymptotic and hold for any opponent. The algorithm, which uses the multiplicative-weight methods of Littlestone and Warmuth, is analyzed using the Kullback-Liebler divergence. This analysis yields a new, simple proof of the min-max theorem, as well as a provable method...
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作者：Yi, SS
作者单位：Dartmouth College
摘要：This article shows that the Pareto efficient frontier of the Nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition-proof under the following conditions: (1) the game has three players, or, alternatively, a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum (but not on the composition) of other players' strategies; (2) an increase in a player's strategy either raises all other players' payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically; and (3) each prayer's payoff is s...
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作者：Amir, R; Grilo, I
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We reconsider Stackelberg's classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for two-player games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play. While our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former, they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions. No extraneous ...
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作者：Bikhchandani, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Simultaneous seared bid auctions of heterogeneous objects are analyzed. Each bidder's reservation value for an object depends upon the other objects he obtains. Bidders' reservation values are common knowledge. in simultaneous first-price auctions, the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations contains the set of pure strategy Nash equilibrium allocations which in turn contains the set of strict Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Hence, pure strategy Nash equilibria (when they exist) are effici...
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作者：Neyman, A; Okada, D
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We introduce the entropy-based measure of uncertainty for mixed strategies of repeated games-strategic entropy. We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of player 1's strategies while player 2 is unrestricted, as the bound grows to infinity. We apply the results thus obtained to study the asymptotic behavior of the value of the repeated games with finite automata and bounded recall. Journal of Econom...
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作者：Nakanishi, N
作者单位：Kobe University
摘要：It is well known in international trade that a unique Nash equilibrium of a static quota game is no-trade and the Rodriguez-Tower alternating retaliation process yields the same outcome. Yet, they fail to capture the notion of retaliation appropriately. Using the framework of the theory of social situation, we construct a model of the quota retaliation as an individual contingent threats situation. In a static, non-cooperative setting, we show that every solution, called a stable standard of b...
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作者：Wit, J
作者单位：Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
摘要：This paper describes the experimental results of a dynamic voting game. Subjects are induced with common preferences, but have asymmetric and incomplete information about the payoff-generating behavior of two available proposals. The election process serves as a mechanism to gather the dispersed information. It is shown that subjects are more effective in coordinating their decisions to a socially optimal equilibrium when they get more experienced. The way they succeed in doing this is by payi...
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作者：Hopkins, E
作者单位：University of Edinburgh
摘要：Fictitious play and stimulus-response/reinforcement learning are examined in the context of a large population where agents are repeatedly randomly matched. We show that the aggregation of this learning behavior can be qualitatively different from learning at the level of the individual. This aggregate dynamic belongs to the same class of simply defined dynamic as do several formulations of evolutionary dynamics. We obtain sufficient conditions for convergence and divergence which are valid fo...
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作者：Fudenberg, D; Levine, DK
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Forecasts are said to be calibrated if the frequency predictions are approximately correct. This is a refinement of an idea first introduced by David Blackwell in 1955. We show that K-initialized myopic strategies are approximately calibrated when K is large. These strategies first initialize by making each forecast exactly K times, and thereafter play, in each period t, the minmax strategy in a static game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, C63, D83. (C) 1999 Ac...
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作者：Hamiache, G
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：The aim of this article is to present a new value of a cooperative game for the case of limited communication between players. The communication system we consider may be represented by a simple graph, that is, only pairwise meetings can occur and some of them are not permitted. An associated game is defined and the value has to verify a consistency axiom. The generalization proposed here is different from the Myerson value, and it coincides with the Shapley value in the case of full communica...
