Social learning in a common interest voting game
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Wit, J
署名单位：
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; University of Amsterdam
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0634
发表日期：
1999
页码：
131-156
关键词：
摘要：
This paper describes the experimental results of a dynamic voting game. Subjects are induced with common preferences, but have asymmetric and incomplete information about the payoff-generating behavior of two available proposals. The election process serves as a mechanism to gather the dispersed information. It is shown that subjects are more effective in coordinating their decisions to a socially optimal equilibrium when they get more experienced. The way they succeed in doing this is by paying less attention to the popularity of a proposal. Classification Numbers: D72, D82. (C) 1999 Academic Press.