Reexamination of the international export quota game through the theory of social situations
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Nakanishi, N
署名单位：
Kobe University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0677
发表日期：
1999
页码：
132-152
关键词：
摘要：
It is well known in international trade that a unique Nash equilibrium of a static quota game is no-trade and the Rodriguez-Tower alternating retaliation process yields the same outcome. Yet, they fail to capture the notion of retaliation appropriately. Using the framework of the theory of social situation, we construct a model of the quota retaliation as an individual contingent threats situation. In a static, non-cooperative setting, we show that every solution, called a stable standard of behavior, supports at least one Pareto-efficient combination of quotas and vice versa. Free trade can be rationalized by a solution. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C79, F13. (C) 1999 Academic Press.