Stackelberg versus Cournot equilibrium
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Amir, R; Grilo, I
署名单位：
University of Southern Denmark; Universite Catholique Louvain
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0650
发表日期：
1999
页码：
1-21
关键词：
摘要：
We reconsider Stackelberg's classical critique of the Cournot duopoly, in the framework of endogenous timing for two-player games. For quantity duopoly we provide different sets of minimal conditions, directly on the demand and cost functions, yielding respectively the simultaneous and the two sequential modes of play. While our findings essentially confirm the predominance of the former, they also indicate that the latter is natural under some robust but restrictive conditions. No extraneous assumptions (such as concavity, existence, or uniqueness of equilibria...) are needed, and the analysis makes crucial use of the basic results from the theory of supermodular games. Classification Numbers: B21, C72, D43, L13. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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