Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Neyman, A; Okada, D
署名单位：
Hebrew University of Jerusalem; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0674
发表日期：
1999
页码：
191-223
关键词：
摘要：
We introduce the entropy-based measure of uncertainty for mixed strategies of repeated games-strategic entropy. We investigate the asymptotic behavior of the maxmin values of repeated two-person zero-sum games with a bound on the strategic entropy of player 1's strategies while player 2 is unrestricted, as the bound grows to infinity. We apply the results thus obtained to study the asymptotic behavior of the value of the repeated games with finite automata and bounded recall. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C73, C72. (C) 1999 Academic Press.