On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Yi, SS
署名单位：
Dartmouth College
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1006/game.1998.0656
发表日期：
1999
页码：
353-364
关键词：
摘要：
This article shows that the Pareto efficient frontier of the Nash equilibrium set of games with strategic substitutes is coalition-proof under the following conditions: (1) the game has three players, or, alternatively, a player's payoff depends on her own strategy and on the sum (but not on the composition) of other players' strategies; (2) an increase in a player's strategy either raises all other players' payoffs monotonically or reduces them monotonically; and (3) each prayer's payoff is strictly concave in her own strategy. Under these conditions, the Pareto dominance refinement is equivalent to the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refinement. Classification Number: C72. (C) 1999 Academic Press.
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